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FOOTNOTES
1 See Harl, 1 Agricultural Law Digest 117
(1990).
2 I.R.C. § 351(a).
3 I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 368(c).
4 I.R.C. § 368(c).
5 See 7 Harl, Agricultural Law § 53.07
(1990).
6 Ltr. Rul. 7924003, Feb. 26, 1979; Ltr.
Rul. 7942094, May 14, 1979; Ltr. Rul.
7935005, May 18, 1979.
7 Ltr. Rul. 8303025, Oct. 15, 1982.
8 Ltr. Rul. 8431032, no date given.
9 See 7 Harl, supra note 5, § 53.07.
1 0 See, e.g., Adolph Weinberg, 44 T.C. 233
(1965), aff'd per curiam sub. nom .,
Comm'r v. Sugar Daddy, Inc., 386 F.2d
836 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 929 (1968).
1 1 Id.
1 2 I.R.C. § 482.
1 3 305 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962).
1 4 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 874 (1952).
1 5 Ltr. Rul. 8351003, Aug. 23, 1983.
1 6 586 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Wash. 1983).
1 7 573 F.2d 12 (E.D. Wash. 1983).
1 8 See, e.g., Connery v. U.S., 460 F.2d
1130 (3d Cir. 1972) (prepaid advertising).
1 9 See Nash v. U.S., 398 U. S. 1 (1970)
(involving bad debt reserves).
2 0 Cf. Rev. Rul. 60-331, 1960-2 C.B. 189.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
ANIMALS
FENCES. The plaintiff sued the
defendant for injury to himself and his
mares from the defendant's stallions which
escaped from the defendant's fenced
property and broke through the plaintiff's
fence to reach the mares.  The plaintiff
injured his achilles' heel in attempting to
capture the stallions.  The court held that
the defendant was liable for the injuries to
the mares even though the plaintiff failed
to show that the county had passed a stock
election law requiring livestock owners to
fence in there livestock, because the plain-
tiff had an adequate fence around the mares.
The defendant was held not liable for the
injury to the plaintiff's heel because the
injury was not foreseeable from the escape
of the stallions.  Gray v. Davis, 7 9 2
S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
DISCHARGE.  The debtor sold a trac-
tor at a yard sale without prior consent of
the creditor who held a security interest in
the tractor.  The court held that the inten-
tional and unauthorized sale of the tractor
collateral was a "willful and malicious"
injury to the property of the creditor and
the claim for the loan secured by the trac-
tor was nondischargeable.  The court held
that the creditor did not have to prove
specific intent by the debtor to harm the
creditor.  In re Thomas, 116 B . R .
287 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS.  The
debtor had entered into an agricultural
equipment lease for a silo and accessories.
The debtor did not assume or reject the
equipment lease and the lessor petitioned
the court for administrative expenses for
the rental of the silo from the date of
bankruptcy filing to the date of its petition
for rejection of the lease.  The debtor
argued that the silo was broken and not
used since before the filing for bankruptcy.
The court held that because the silo was
broken and of no use to the estate, the
administrative expense for rent was denied
under Section 503(b) because the rental of
the silo was not a necessary expense of
preserving the estate.  Kinnan &
Kinnan Partnership v. Agristor
Leasing, 116 B.R. 162 (D. Neb.
1990) .
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtor claimed
an interest in an IRA as exempt under
Section 522(d)(10)(E).  The court held that
the IRA was exempt as a "similar plan"
and because the amount in the IRA was
reasonably necessary for the debtor's sup-
port.  In re  Cilek, 115 B.R. 9 7 4
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990).
The debtor's interest in an ERISA
qualified profit-sharing plan was held to be
estate property an not eligible for an
exemption as a spendthrift trust.  The
court also held that the anti-alienation
provisions of ERISA invalidated a
creditor's security interest in the plan
proceeds.  The debtor's employer was
ordered to turnover the plan funds to the
trustee who was ordered to use the funds
first to pay any federal taxes resulting
from the distribution of the funds.  In re
Green, 115 B.R. 1001 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1990).
The debtors' interests in an ERISA
qualified plan were held not included in the
debtors' bankruptcy estates because the
plan was a spendthrift trust where the plan
absolutely prohibited alienation of 90 per-
cent of the plan and prohibited irrevocable
assignments of the remaining 10 percent.
In re  LeFeber, 906 F.2d 330 (7th
Cir. 1990).
The self-employed debtor's interest in
an IRA was held exempt under Wis. Stat.
§ 815.18(31).  The court rejected, how-
ever, the debtor's argument that property
would be exempt merely upon the failure
of the trustee to timely object to the
claimed exemption.  The court held that
the exemption must be allowed by law
before the failure of the trustee to object
will result in allowance of the exemption.
Apparently, the court's holding means that
objections to claimed exemptions may be
made at any time.  In re  Staniforth,
116 B.R. 127 (Bankr. W.D. W i s .
1990) .
The debtor's interest in a pension fund
was held to be a spendthrift trust under
Michigan law and therefore excluded from
the bankruptcy estate.  Under the pension
plan, the debtor could receive payments
only upon retirement and the debtor had no
right to borrow from the plan, require
distributions for hardship or obtain distri-
butions upon termination of employment
other than retirement.  Jacobs v .
Shields, 116 B.R. 134 (D. Minn.
1990) .
The court held that the Missouri
exemption for ERISA qualified pension
plans to the extent necessary for the
support of the debtor was not pre-empted
by ERISA and the retired debtor was
entitled to exempt payments from the
plan.  In re  Vickers, 116 B.R. 1 4 9
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990).
The debtors filed their declaration of
homestead for their residence and aban-
donment of their former residence one day
after filing bankruptcy.  Under Washing-
ton law, a debtor may filed a declaration of
homestead up to the date of sale of the
residence and still claim a homestead
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exemption for that residence.  The court
held that the debtors' were entitled to a
homestead exemption.  In re  Git ts ,
116 B.R. 174 (Bankr. 9th Cir .
1990) .
The debtor claimed an exemption,
under Mont. Code § 31-2-106(3), for an
interest in an ERISA qualified pension
trust established by the debtor's employer,
a corporation solely owned by the debtor.
The court held that the trust was not
eligible for the exemption as a spendthrift
trust because the debtor was considered the
settlor of the trust where the debtor owned
the corporation which established the
trust.  In re  Ullman, 116 B.R. 2 2 8
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
The debtor's interest in an ERISA
qualified pension plan was held included in
bankruptcy estate property because the
plan was not a spendthrift trust under
Colorado law and not exempt under the
Colorado pension plan exemption.  The
Colorado exemption was held pre-empted
by ERISA.  However, ERISA was held to
be a federal nonbankruptcy exemption and
the debtor's interest in the plan was
exempt under ERISA.  In re  Starkey,
116 B.R. 259 (Bankr. D. C o l o .
1990) .
The debtor's interest in an ERISA
qualified pension plan was not a
spendthrift trust and  was included in the
bankruptcy estate were the debtor upon
termination of employment could require a
distribution of the debtor's contributions
and the vested amount of the employer's
contributions.  The court also held that the
Oklahoma exemption for ERISA plans
was pre-empted by ERISA.  In re
McIntosh, 116 B.R. 277 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 1990).
The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption in a residence in which the
debtor lived but in which title was held
solely by the debtor's spouse.  The court
held that the debtor was entitled to the
homestead exemption in the residence
where the debtor contributed amounts
toward the purchase and upkeep of the
residence and under Florida law the debtor,
as a head of the family, owned an equitable
interest in the residence.  In re
Wainsztein, 116 B.R. 300 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1990).
  CHAPTER 11
DISMISSAL.  The debtor had obtained
a confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan and
made several of the payments under the
plan but at the hearing on the final report,
the court found that the debtor was in
default on many payments due to secured
creditors under the plan.  These creditors
moved for dismissal of the case and revo-
cation of confirmation of the plan and the
debtor's discharge.  The court held that the
request for revocation of the confirmation
was untimely because it was filed more
than 180 days after the confirmation order.
The request was also denied because the
court found that the confirmation was not
obtained by the debtor through fraud.  One
creditor argued that Section 349 required
the dismissal of the case to revoke all
orders of the bankruptcy case and place the
debtor in the same position, as to credi-
tors, as before the bankruptcy case.  The
court held that Section 349 operated only
to revoke those actions listed in the
section and did not revoke the confirma-
tion order or discharge of the debtor.
Matter of Depew, 115 B.R. 9 6 5
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
  CHAPTER 12
DISCHARGE.  A judgment of misap-
plication of loan funds against the debtor
under the Disaster Relief Act was held not
entitled to preclusive effect in a Chapter
12 bankruptcy case on the issue of dis-
chargeability under Sections 523(a)(2)(A)
and (a)(6).  In re  Davis, 116 B . R .
306 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1990).
ELIGIBILITY.  The court held that the
debtor was not eligible for Chapter 12
bankruptcy while the debtor's Chapter 11
case remained open.  In re  Gerth, 1 1 6
B.R. 167 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1989).
  CHAPTER 13
ELIGIBILITY.  The FmHA held a
mortgage on the debtor's farmland which
was undersecured by $150,000.  At the
confirmation hearing, the FmHA objected
on the grounds that the debtor had more
than the $100,000 in unsecured debts
allowed for Chapter 13 debtors.  The court
held that the debtor was not eligible for
Chapter 13 because the undersecured
portion of the FmHA mortgage was
considered unsecured debt.  Miller v .
U.S., 907 F.2d 80 (8th Cir .
1990) .
PLAN.  The debtor's Chapter 13 plan
modified the payment terms and interest
rate of a junior secured lien against the
debtor's residence.  The junior creditor
argued that Section 1321(b)(2) prohibited
modification of the secured claim against
the debtor's residence.  The court held that
debt was not covered by Section
1322(b)(2) because it was short term
consumer debt secured by the residence.
Capitol Credit Plan of Tenn., Inc.
v. Shaffer, 116 B.R. 60 (W.D.
Va. 1988), aff'g 84 B.R. 6 3
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
ALLOCATION OF PLAN PAY-
MENTS FOR TAXES.  The IRS was
allowed to allocate Chapter 13 plan pay-
ments first to the penalty portion of the
tax claims because the court held that such
payments were involuntary.  In re
Buzek, 116 B.R. 82 (Bankr. N . D .
Ohio 1990).
DISCHARGE.  The debtors sought to
discharge penalties for failure to file and
pay taxes which were assessed more than
three years before the bankruptcy filing.
The court held that Section 523(a)(7)
allows the discharge of penalties imposed
on dischargeable taxes and penalties
imposed more than three years before the
bankruptcy filing.  In re Roberts, 9 0 6
B.R. 1440 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'g
unrep. D. Ct. dec., aff'g 94 B . R .
707 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989).
After the debtors received a discharge,
the IRS assessed and set off against
refunds amounts for taxes which had been
paid fully under the debtors' Chapter 13
plan.  The court held that the assessments
and setoffs violated the permanent injunc-
tion of Section 524 and awarded the
debtors attorney's fees as a sanction
against the IRS.  In re  Bryant, 1 1 6
B.R. 272 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1990).
RESPONSIBLE PERSON.  Taxpayer,
who was the treasurer of a church school,
was held not to be a responsible person
liable for failure of the school to pay
withholding taxes where the taxpayer only
had the authority to sign school checks
but had no authority as to which bills
were to be paid.  In re  Tripplett, 1 1 5
B.R. 955 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
The debtor corporation and the corpora-
tion's president sought to enjoin the IRS
from collecting the 100 percent penalty
against the president as a responsible
person liable for failure of the corporation
to pay withholding taxes.  The court held
that it had no jurisdiction to enjoin the
IRS under I.R.C. § 7421.  In re  Upton
Printing Co., Inc., 116 B.R. 6 6
(Bankr. E.D. La. 1989).
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CONTRACTS
GOOD FAITH DEALING.  The
defendant defaulted on a loan from the
plaintiff collateralized with dairy cows.
The defendant arranged for a third party to
purchase the cows and resell the cows to
the defendant and requested, under Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 79.2080, the plaintiff to
supply information about the loan for use
in the sale.  The plaintiff failed to comply
with the request until one before requiring
the defendant to turnover the collateral for
sale.  The failure to provide the informa-
tion caused the sale of the cows to the
third party to fall through.  The court held
that the plaintiff breached its duty of good
faith and fair dealing in failing to
promptly provide the information where
the information was readily available.  The
court also held that although the loan was
a U.C.C. transaction, the general duty of
good faith and fair dealing applied to the
transaction as supplemental law consistent
with the policies of the U.C.C.  U . S .
Nat'l Bank v. Boge, 794 P.2d 8 0 1
(Or. Ct. App. 1990).
JURISDICTION.  The defendant
sold cattle to a resident of South Dakota
who later resold the cattle to the plaintiff
who also was a resident of South Dakota.
The defendant argued that South Dakota
did not have personal jurisdiction in an
action for damages resulting from the sale
of overly vaccinated cattle because of lack
of contact with South Dakota.  The court
held that personal jurisdiction was valid
over the defendant because the defendant
was informed at the time of sale that the
cattle would be resold in South Dakota,
payment for the cattle was from a check
on a South Dakota bank, and the cause of
action arose from activities directed at
South Dakota.  Opp v. Nieuwsma,
458 N.W.2d 352 (S.D. 1990).
WARRANTY.  In an action for the
sale of excessively vaccinated cattle, the
court held that the buyer timely informed
the seller of the defect in the cattle when a
letter disclosing the problem was sent to
the seller four months after the defect was
discovered but while the cattle were still
sick.  Opp v. Nieuwsma, 4 5 8
N.W.2d 352 (S.D. 1990).
CORPORATIONS
LIQUIDATION.  The plaintiff filed
an amended petition against the former
sole shareholder and director of a corpora-
tion which owed the plaintiff on a
promissory note given before dissolution
of the corporation.  The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant was liable for the
amount owed by the corporation under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2046 because the
defendant assented to the distribution of
the corporation's assets to the defendant
after dissolution without making adequate
provision for the corporation's creditors.
The defendant argued that the action was
time barred by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-
20,104 in that the promissory note was
given prior to dissolution of the corpora-
tion.  The court held that the amended
petition was not time-barred because the
alleged liability of the defendant arose
during the liquidation of the corporation
after dissolution.  W&K Farms, Inc.
v. Walter, 235 Neb. 952, 4 5 8
N.W.2d 230 (1990).
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS.  The APHIS has
announced that Nevada was changed from a
Class A to a Class Free state under the
brucellosis regulations.  55 Fed. R e g .
37312 (Sept. 11, 1990).
CLEAN WATER ACT.  The
Army Corps of Engineers issued a cease
and desist order to the plaintiff to stop
unauthorized discharges into wetland and
waters of the U.S. of fill material from the
construction of fish ponds by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff brought an action to enjoin
the Corps from further action to halt the
construction of the ponds.  The court held
that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
prevented the plaintiff's cause of action
because the issue involved the Corps
interpretation of the statutory and
regulatory definitions of "wetland" and
"waters of the U.S."  In addition, the cause
of action was not ripe because the Corps
had not taken a final agency action but
only issued the cease and desist order for
the period of further investigation into the
actions of the plaintiff.  Fercom
Aquaculture Corp. v. U.S., 7 4 0
F.Supp. 736 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
CROP INSURANCE .  The FCIC
has adopted as final amendments to the
Arizona-California citrus crop insurance
regulation to change the date by which
insureds are required to submit reports of
production.  55 Fed. Reg. 35888
(Sept. 4, 1990).
The FCIC has adopted as final
amendments to the Potato crop insurance
regulations to change the date for the end
of the insurance period for potatoes in
Delaware, New Jersey and Maryland.  5 5
Fed. Reg. 35888 (Sept. 4, 1990).
The FCIC has announced an interim
rule amending the 1991 crop insurance
policies for apples, citrus, sweet corn,
peaches, seed corn, macadamia nuts and
trees, peas, peanuts, peppers, popcorn,
potatoes, prunes, sugar beets, grapes,
tobacco, tomatoes, walnuts and nursery
crops are subject to the availability of
appropriations.  55 Fed. Reg. 35886
(Sept. 4, 1990).
DAIRY TERMINATION PRO-
GRAM.  The plaintiff was a dairy farmer
who entered into a contract to dispose of
dairy cattle under the federal Dairy Termi-
nation Program (DTP).  After an anony-
mous tip and a local investigation, the
USDA charged the plaintiff with cow-
switching in violation of the DTP
contract, declared the plaintiff ineligible to
receive DTP payments, imposed a $1,000
fine and declared the plaintiff still bound
by the terms of the DTP contract prohibit-
ing the production of milk for five years.
The plaintiff argued that the DTP contract,
under language in an appendix, required
only that he dispose of the cows owned on
or after the contract bid date, which would
include the new cows obtained in a switch
with a neighbor.  The court that the
requirement in the contract requiring the
disposal of all dairy cattle owned "on the
bid date" was not inconsistent with the
appendix language requiring disposal of all
cattle owned "on or after the bid date"
because the appendix language was meant
to include only calves to the cows owned
on the bid date.  This interpretation was
supported by the calculations of the milk
production based upon the cows owned by
the plaintiff on the bid date and the
specific identification of the plaintiffs'
cows owned on the bid date in the con-
tract.  Martin v. U.S., 20 Cls. C t .
738 (1990).
The plaintiff leased dairy cows to a
dairy farmer which were enrolled in the
Dairy Termination Program (DTP).  The
plaintiff retained and filed a security
interest in the cows.  The farmer con-
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signed some of the cows for sale for
slaughter through the defendant, a live-
stock selling agent without first obtaining
the permission of the plaintiff.  The
defendant argued that the cows were not
converted because the cows were required
to be slaughtered anyway under the DTP.
The court held that the defendant was
liable for conversion of the cows because
the DTP also allowed the sale of the cows
for export.  Therefore, the defendant was
liable for any loss resulting from the sale
of the cows for slaughter instead of for
export.  The court remanded the case for
determination of punitive damages but
held that Minn. Stat. § 609.551 did not
allow treble damages because the defendant
was not convicted of theft.  Dairy Farm
Leasing v. Haas Livestock, 4 5 8
N.W.2d 417 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990) .
PEANUTS .  The AMS has issued
proposed regulations which would require
all domestically produced peanuts handled
by persons who have not entered into the
Peanut Marketing Agreement to be
inspected to the same extent and in the
same manner as required under the agree-
ment.  The proposed regulations would
also require handlers of non-agreement
peanuts to comply with the agreement
reporting and disposition requirements.
55 Fed. Reg. 37238 (Sept. 1 0 ,
1990) .
RURAL HOUSING.  The FmHA
has adopted as final amendments to the
rural rental housing loan regulations to
allow the use of contract appraisers.  5 5
Fed. Reg. 35890 (Sept. 4, 1990).
TOBACCO.  The 1990 marketing
quota for flue-cured tobacco is 877.7
million pounds, the national acreage
allotment is 420.354.41 acres, and the
price support level is $1.488 per pound.
55 Fed. Reg. 36674 (Sept. 6 ,
1990) .
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
ESTATE INCOME TAX.  On the
federal estate tax return, the estate claimed
deductions for personal representative's
commissions and attorney's fees.  Under a
settlement with objecting estate beneficia-
ries, the representative and attorney waived
all or part of their fees with the benefit of
the waived fees going to the objecting
beneficiaries.  IRS ruled that because more
than three years had passed since the estate
tax return, no additional estate tax was due
absent fraud in the original return.  IRS
also ruled that the representative was not
liable for income tax on fees waived and
not received.  IRS ruled that the estate
would realize income from discharge of
indebtedness owed to the attorney and
representative but would be allowed a
deduction for distribution of this income
to the estate beneficiaries who are required
to include the amounts in gross income.
Ltr. Rul. 9033034, May 22, 1990.
      GENERATION SKIPPING
TRANSFERS .  The settlor established
five trusts, one for each child, which were
irrevocable on September 25, 1985.  The
beneficiaries proposed to add each
beneficiary as a co-trustee of their trust.
IRS ruled that the amendment to each trust
adding the beneficiary as a co-trustee did
not subject the trust to GSTT.  In
addition, IRS ruled that the appointment
of each beneficiary as co-trustee would not
make the trust includible in the
beneficiary's estate.  Ltr. R u l .
9034031, May 24, 1990.
The surviving spouse disclaimed an
interest in property bequeathed by the
decedent who was mentally incompetent
on October 22, 1986, and until death.
IRS ruled that the passing of the
disclaimed interests to the decedent's
grandchildren was not subject to GSTT.
Ltr. Rul. 9035057, May 30, 1990.
GROSS ESTATE.  The decedent
had received property from grandparents
under a deed which conveyed a life estate
in the property to the decedent and the
decedent's brother, with the remainders to
pass to each brother's "bodily heirs."  If a
brother died without bodily heirs the
brother's interest was to pass to the
surviving brother's bodily heirs.  IRS
argued that the rule in Shelley's case,
under Texas law, applied to give the
decedent a fee simple interest in the
property, thus including it in the
decedent's gross estate.  The tax court held
that the rule in Shelley's case did not
apply because the deed used the terms
"bodily heirs" to refer only to the brothers'
children because a surviving brother could
not have heirs.  Est. of Forest v .
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1990-464.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION.
The IRS ruled that the granting of a
permanent underground pipeline easement
on specially valued property did not cause
recapture of special use valuation benefits
where the pipeline did not interrupt or
affect the use of the specially valued
property.  Ltr. Rul. 9035007, May
25, 1990.
TRANSFERS WITH RE-
TAINED INTERESTS.  The taxpayer,
aged 60, proposed to transfer a portion of
nonvoting common stock to a ten-year
irrevocable trust with the taxpayer as
beneficiary.  The trust corpus passes to the
taxpayer's estate if the taxpayer dies before
the trust terminates, otherwise upon
termination of the trust in ten years, the
trust corpus passes to the taxpayer's
children.  The IRS ruled that the taxpayer
retained a power to require any unproduc-
tive property in the trust to be converted
into productive property; therefore, the
taxpayer's retained income interest in the
trust is initially valued at its full potential
value.  The IRS applied a rate of 11 per-
cent (120 percent of the applicable federal
midterm rate for June 1990) to determine
the present worth of the right to receive
income from the trust from $1.00 for ten
years or until death of a person aged 60 as
$0.60372.  The actuarial factor for the
taxpayer's reversion interest in the trust
was $0.10920.  Because the present value
of the taxpayer's reversion did not exceed
25 percent of the value of the income
interest, the taxpayer's interest was a
qualified trust income interest not subject
to Section 2036(c)(6).  The IRS also ruled
that so long as the taxpayer does not let
the trust assets become unproductive, the
taxpayer will not be considered to have
made gifts to the remaindermen during the
term of the trust. Ltr. Rul 9035017 ,
May 30, 1990.  
The taxpayer transferred stock to an
irrevocable ten year trust with the taxpayer
as sole beneficiary but not as trustee.
After ten years, the trust corpus passes to
trusts for the taxpayer's children.  The
trust provided that in the event the trust
income falls below the amount required
under the state Uniform Principal and
Income Act, the amount of insufficient
income must be distributed to the taxpayer
upon the sale of trust property.  The trust
income was to be based upon the rate
established under I.R.C. § 7520.  If any
insufficient amount of income remains at
the termination of the trust, a sale of trust
property is deemed to occur.  The IRS
ruled that the transfer of the remainder
interests was a completed gift when the
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trust was funded.  The value of the gift
was the value of the property transferred to
the trust less the value of the income
interest retained by the taxpayer, deter-
mined using the 120 percent applicable
federal mid-term rate for the month of the
transfer.  Because of the automatic income
adjustment provisions of the trust, the
IRS ruled that the taxpayer will not be
considered to have made gifts to the
remaindermen during the term of the trust.
The IRS also ruled that the taxpayer's
interest in the trust was a qualified trust
income interest not includible in the tax-
payer's gross estate under Section
2036(c)(6).  Ltr. Rul. 9035022, May
31, 1990.  See also Ltr. R u l .
9035029, May 31, 1990 (same result
on similar facts).
The taxpayer and spouse transferred
their stock in a corporation to their child
and to the corporation in exchange for title
to the residence owned by the corporation
and cash.  The taxpayer entered into an
employment agreement with the corpora-
tion to serve as general manager for three
years with an annual salary, use of two
cars and maintenance on the house as
compensation.  The taxpayer also agreed
to a covenant not to compete for one day
less than three years.  The IRS ruled that
the employment agreement complied with
Section 2036(c)(7) and was not a retained
interest causing the transferred stock to be
includible in the taxpayer's gross estate.
Ltr. Rul. 9035059, June 5, 1990.
VALUATION.  The decedent held a
51.41 percent share of a family closely
owned corporation.  Eighteen days before
death, the decedent transferred .88 percent
of the stock to her children with the result
that the remaining 49.65 percent of the
corporation's stock passing in a testamen-
tary gift would constitute a minority share
for purposes of estate tax valuation.  The
court held that the stock would not receive
a discount for the minority share because
the pre-death gift was made with intent to
avoid estate tax.  The stock did receive a
discount for lack of marketability because
state, Wisconsin, law restricted complete
liquidations.  Est. of Murphy v .
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1990-472.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHODS.  A
farm corporation owned two subsidiary
farm corporations.  The corporations plan
to merge with one subsidiary remaining as
the sole corporation in tax free mergers
under Section 368(a)(1)(A).  The merging
subsidiary was required to change to the
accrual method of accounting but because
it was a family farm corporation, the
corporation established a suspense account
under Section 447(i) in lieu of taking into
account adjustments under section 481.
The remaining subsidiary plans to elect to
be treated as an S corporation and will
qualify as a family farm corporation.  The
IRS ruled that the merger will not affect
the balance of the suspense account; how-
ever, the remaining corporation will
continue to be required to maintain the
suspense account even when it becomes an
S corporation.  IRS also ruled that any
reductions in the suspense account would
be considered taxable as built-in gains for
the S corporation.  Ltr. R u l .
9035027, May 31, 1990.
BAD DEBTS.  The taxpayer was not
allowed a deduction for bad debts where the
uncollectible accounts receivable had no
value when acquired by the taxpayer and
therefore did not lose value during the
taxable year.  Wedum Supply C o . ,
Inc. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1990-468 .
  C CORPORATIONS
NET OPERATING LOSSES.  The
IRS has issued proposed regulations
amending the option attribution rules for
determining stock ownership in order to
determine whether certain transactions in
bankruptcy qualify under Section 382(l)(5)
involving exceptions to the corporate net
operating loss carryforward limitations.
the proposed rules limit relief under
Section 382(l)(5) to ownership changes in
which pre-change shareholders and
qualified creditors maintain a substantial
continuing interest in the loss corporation
following the bankruptcy case.  55 Fed.
Reg. 36657 (Sept. 6, 1990 ) ,
amending Treas. Reg. §§ 1 .382 -
2T(h)(4), 1.382-3(c), (d).
COOPERATIVES.  IRS ruled that
a tax exempt agricultural cooperative did
not lose its tax exempt status from the
purchase of agricultural products from
non-member producers on an emergency
basis to meet the needs of pre-existing
contract obligations with refineries during
a year of low production of the products.
Ltr. Rul. 9034043, May 29, 1990.
DEPRECIATION.  The taxpayers
were denied a depreciation deduction and
investment tax credit for an oil painting
because the taxpayers failed to prove the
painting's useful life.  Clinger v .
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1990-459.
The taxpayers were denied depreciation
and investment interest deductions from a
computer leasing investment where the
investments were made primarily for tax
benefits and were held to be sham transac-
tions because the investments were made
with no expectation of a reasonable profit.
Hines v. U.S., 90-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,477 (4th Cir .
1990), rev'g 89-2 U.S.Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 9523 (N.D. N.C. 1989).
INSTALLMENT REPORTING.
IRS has announced the intent to amend
Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(c)(7) to clarify
that the IRS may require an alternative
method of basis recovery with respect to
installment obligation where basis is
inappropriately deferred.  The amendment
is aimed at transactions which are claimed
to permit the creation of artificial gain and
deferred losses.  Notice 90-56, I .R.B.
1990-38, Aug. 31, 1990.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT.
The taxpayers' claims for investment tax
credit for a computer system and software
were disallowed where the court found the
transactions to be shams and entered into
solely for tax benefits.  The taxpayers
were found to have no computer expertise,
consulted no experts and made no substan-
tial effort to sell the computer systems.
Fisher v. U.S., 90-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,478 (W.D. N . C .
1990) .
RETIREMENT PLANS.  The IRS
has issued modifications to the reporting
procedures for contributions to qualified
plans.  The amendments (1) extend the
effective date for contributions made for
plan years beginning after December 31,
1989, (2) change the deadline for
requesting rulings under Rev. Proc. 89-35,
1989-1 C.B. 917, (3) revise the
information requirements for a ruling
request under Rev. Proc. 89-35, (4) furnish
a worksheet for actuarial computations,
and (5) provide that de minimis
nondeductible employer contributions to a
qualified defined benefit plan may be
returned to the taxpayer without a formal
ruling or disallowance from the IRS.
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Rev. Proc. 90-49, I.R.B. 1990-
39, Sept. 5, 1990.
  S CORPORATIONS
INADVERTENT TERMINATION.
The corporation's S corporation status was
ruled inadvertently terminated where the
corporation purchased the stock of another
corporation in order to obtain that corpora-
tion's license and distributed the stock to
shareholder immediately upon learning
that the acquisition of the stock terminated
the S corporation election.  Ltr. R u l .
9034013, May 23, 1990.
The corporation's S corporation status
was ruled inadvertently terminated where
the sole shareholder's stock was transferred
to a trust upon the death of the shareholder
and the trust failed to make the required
elections until discovery of the failure.
Ltr. Rul. 9034020, May 23, 1990.
S TRUSTS.  The taxpayer proposed to
transfer a portion of nonvoting common
stock to a ten-year irrevocable trust with
the taxpayer as beneficiary.  The trust cor-
pus passes to the taxpayer's estate if the
taxpayer dies before the trust terminates,
otherwise upon termination of the trust in
ten years, the trust corpus passes to the
taxpayer's children.  IRS ruled that the
trust qualified as a subchapter S trust.
Ltr. Rul 9035017, May 30, 1990.
THEFT LOSS .  The corporation
taxpayer discovered an embezzlement of
corporation funds that had been occurring
for three years by the business manager.
The taxpayer filed income tax returns
which claimed the losses in the years in
which the losses incurred.  The court held
that for purposes of determining personal
holding company tax (PHC), the taxpayer
would be allowed to deduct the losses in
the year in which they occurred instead of
the year in which they were discovered.
The court reasoned that for purposes of the
PHC tax, literal compliance with the
discovery rule of Section 165(e) in the
case of embezzlement would penalize the
taxpayer in a manner not intended by
Congress.  Warren Ink v. Comm'r,
90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,465 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'g 9 2
T.C. 995 (1989).
TRUSTS .  The taxpayer was a
beneficiary of a trust and held a noncumu-
lative power to require annual distributions
of trust corpus equal to the greater of
$5,000 or 5 percent of the value of the
trust principal.  The trust sold its remain-
ing asset with gain.  IRS ruled that the
beneficiary was the owner of the "5 and 5"
interest each year whether distributed or
not and the beneficiary was liable for the
proportion of gain attributable to the "5
and 5" portion.  Ltr. Rul. 9034004 ,
May 17, 1990.
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS.
IRS has ruled that supplemental unem-
ployment compensation benefits (SUB)
paid by an employer under a SUB plan are
excludible from the beneficiary's income
only if the payments are linked to the
receipt of state unemployment benefits.
Rev. Rul. 90-72, I.R.B. 1990-36 ,
12 .
MORTGAGES
FORECLOSURE.  The debtors de-
faulted on a deed of trust and the FmHA
purchased the farm property at the sheriff's
sale.  Prior to the sale, the debtors had
leased the farm to their son under a lease
running until two years after the sale of
the property and ending two years before
the filing of the present suit.  The debtors
attempted to repurchase the farm from the
FmHA by tendering a draft from a private
finance company which did not have any
funds to pay the draft but would only seek
public and private financing to support the
draft.  The court held that the draft was not
sufficient tender for the purchase of the
farm because the draft could not be con-
verted to cash or cash equivalent and the
financing to be obtained by the financing
company was too speculative based on the
company's failure to ever secure financing
for other drafts.  The lease between the
debtors and their son was held to be effec-
tive because it was entered into before the
debtors' financial troubles began had there
was no evidence of an attempt to defraud
creditors.  The court held that the FmHA
was entitled to the rent due to it as pur-
chaser from the son as the tenant under an
unexpired lease during the one year period
of redemption.  After that time, the lease
automatically expired and the debtors and
their son were liable to the FmHA for the
fair market rent of the land until they
vacated the property as ordered by the
court.  Kuderer v. U.S., 7 3 9
F.Supp. 1422 (D. Or. 1990).
NEGLIGENCE
EXEMPTIONS.  The plaintiff was
injured by a fall from the roof of a pole
barn on the defendant's dairy farm while
employed by an independent contractor
hired to construct the barn.  The court held
that the defendant was not exempt from
responsibility for failure to provide safe
working conditions under the one-and-two-
family residence exemption under Balduzzi
v. West, 535 N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div.2d
1989), because the dairy was a commercial
operation, even thought the defendant's
lived on the farm.  Gernstl v .
Edwards, 557 N.Y.S.2d 191 (App.
Div. 4th 1990).
PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
ELEVATOR.  The plaintiff was
injured when her hand was caught in the
exposed gears of a corn loading elevator
which was designed with a cover over the
gears which had vibrated off or been
removed by the plaintiff's husband.  The
plaintiff sued the elevator manufacturer in
strict liability and breach of implied war-
ranty.  As to the plaintiff's strict liability
claim, the court held that due to expert
testimony as to the design of the attach-
ment of the cover, a question of fact
remained as to whether the elevator was
unreasonably dangerous and whether the
cover had fallen off or been removed.  As
to the plaintiff's breach of implied war-
ranty claim, the court held that the claim
was barred because the action was filed
more than five years after the sale of the
elevator to the plaintiff's husband.  As to
the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages,
the court held that there remained a ques-
tion of fact as to whether the manufacturer
had knowledge of the inherent dangerous-
ness of the elevator but no evidence was
presented that the manufacturer's conduct
in not changing the design of the cover
was willful and malicious because there
was no evidence of similar accidents.  The
manufacturer asserted the state of the art
defense provided in Iowa Code § 668.12.
The plaintiff claimed that the jury instruc-
tions on this defense failed to identify the
manufacturer's duty to warn of dangerous
conditions discovered after manufacture of
the elevator.  The plaintiff submitted
evidence of the manufacturer's engineers
that identified problems with the covers
falling off from vibrations.  The court held
that the plaintiff had presented sufficient
evidence that the manufacturer knew about
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the defect in the design of the cover to
require the jury instructions to include the
issue of failure to warn.  Fell v .
Kewanee Farm Equip. Co., 4 5 7
N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1990).
FORAGE HARVESTER.  Plain-
tiff was injured while attempting to
unclog a forage harvester owned by the
defendant while helping the defendant to
harvest corn under an informal employ-
ment agreement.  The court ordered sum-
mary judgment for the defendant because
evidence showed no negligence by the
defendant.  The court found that the plain-
tiff was familiar with the harvester and
took the risk of clearing the harvester
while it was still engaged.  The plaintiff
also sued the manufacturer and seller of the
harvester under strict liability and breach
of implied warranty.  The court upheld
denial of summary judgment for these
defendants because a material issue of fact
remained as to whether the harvester was
defectively designed.  Gokey v .
Castine, 558 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App.
Div. 3d 1990).
SECURED
TRANSACTIONS
AUCTIONEERS.  The debtor had
granted the bank a security interest in all
livestock in January 1986.  From January
1986 through January 1987, the defendant,
a livestock market agency, sold hogs
belonging to the debtor and subject to the
security interest and remitted the proceeds
to the debtor.  On February 7, 1986, the
bank was declared insolvent and the FDIC
was appointed as receiver.  On May 5,
1986, the FDIC sent notice to the debtor
not to sell any collateral without prior
written approval.  On July 7, 1986, the
FDIC sent notice to the defendant of the
security interest in the debtor's hogs.  The
FDIC sued the defendant for the proceeds
of the sales of the debtor's hogs made by
the defendant from January 1986 through
January 1987.  The court held that the
bank had waived its security interest in the
hogs for the period from the granting of
the security interest until the bank was
declared insolvent because of the bank
course of dealing with the debtor in not
requiring consent to sell the collateral
prior to sales.  Upon the takeover of the
bank by the FDIC, the FDIC was held not
to have agreed to the bank's waiver of the
debtor's security interest because none of
the factors under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)
were met by the waiver.  Thus, the
security interest remained valid from the
date of the FDIC takeover until December
23, 1986.  On December 23, 1986, the
date Nebraska established a central filing
system under the federal farm products
rule, the FDIC was required to file its
security interest with the secretary of state,
which it did not.  Therefore, from
December 23, 1986 through February
1987, the defendant was not liable for the
proceeds of the sales of the collateral.
FDIC v. Bowles Livestock
Comm'n Co., 739 F. Supp. 1 3 6 4
(D. Neb. 1990).
FEDERAL FARM PRODUCTS
RULE.  The PSA has amended the certi-
fication of the Oklahoma central filing
system to include donkeys, mules, llamas
and grass roots.  55 Fed. Reg. 37341
(Sept. 11, 1990).
    LEASE V. SECURITY INTER-
EST.  The debtor entered into an agricul-
tural equipment lease of a silo and acces-
sories with eight annual rent payments and
the right to purchase the silo for the fair
market value at the end of the lease.  The
court held the lease to be a true lease
because a security deposit was required and
the lease gave the lessor the right to
remove the equipment if the lessee did not
exercise the right to purchase the silo at
the fair market value at the end of the
lease.  Kinnan & Kinnan Partner-
ship v. Agristor Leasing, 1 1 6
B.R. 162 (D. Neb. 1990).
STATE TAXATION
EXEMPTIONS.  The plaintiff ap-
plied for a personal property tax exemp-
tion for egg handling, cleaning and vacci-
nation equipment used in a confinement
laying hen operation.  The court held that
the chicken operation qualified as a farm
under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-1-102(3.5)
and the equipment used in the operation
was exempt from property tax under Colo.
Const. art. X, § 3(1)(c).  Morning
Fresh Farms v. Board of Equaliza-
tion, 794 P.2d 1073 (Colo. App.
1990) .
VALUATION.  The plaintiffs
appealed an assessment of their farmland
and obtained a local court order voiding the
assessment for violation of S.D. Cod.
Laws § 10-6-33.1.  The reassessment
doubled the original assessment but the
local court reduced the valuation to the
original assessment because the higher
values were not uniform to assessments of
other taxpayers in the area.  The Supreme
Court held that the voiding of the first
assessment did not require that any subse-
quent reassessment be lower than the first.
Because the plaintiffs failed to allege or
prove any error of the assessment or lower
court's findings concerning the second
assessment, the reassessment was valid.
Kindsfater v. Butte County, 4 5 8
N.W.2d 347 (S.D. 1990).
CITATION
UPDATE
Ordway v. U.S., 908 F.2d 8 9 0
(11th Cir. 1990), rev'g on point
89-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
13,802 (S.D. Fla. 1989) ,
(disclaimer of interest in trust), see p. 173
supra.
Gunther v. Comm'r, 909 F.2d
291 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'g 92 T.C.
39 (1989) (corporate reorganization), see
p. 166 supra.
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